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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the e¢ cient use of information in the context of a
moral hazard principal-agent framework when the participants are risk neutral
and penaltics are bounded.1 Given an arbitrary information system, potentially
with multidimensional observables, we examine how information should be aggre-
gated optimally. The information system refers to the set of commonly observable
variables correlated with the agents hidden action and with respect to which the
principal can design an incentive scheme.
Due to the risk-neutrality restriction we show that from a mechanism-design
point of view all relevant information can be summarized by a binary statistic.
Consequently, the principal can constraint mechanism without loss of generality to
the set of bonus contracts. All the mechanism needs to specify are a x payment,
a bonus and the terms under which the agent will receive the bonus. We show that
if the original signal satises the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition (hereafter
MLRC, see Milgrom [1981]), the terms for the bonus are independent of the
agents action. We generalize our results by examining the case in which the
su¢ cient binary statistics is state dependent. We conclude by showing that the
1Otherwise the risk neutrality implies that the rst-best solution would be possible with any
information system, as is well known.
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set up allows for a simple ranking criteria of information systems.
In the existing agency literature, there are two prevailing criteria for com-
paring information systems: Holmströms [1979] notion of informativeness and
Blackwells [1951, 1953] e¢ ciency condition.2 Although originally developed in
a statistical or decision theoretic context, both criteria also proved useful to rank
information systems in the agency framework. However, as emphasized by Kim
[1995], there is an essential di¤erence between a statistical or decision theoretic
problem and an agency problem. In the rst case the decision maker attempts
to estimate some unobserved variable, while in the second the principal attempts
to control an action. Based on this observation, Kim introduced a new criterion
dened in terms of a mean-preserving spread (MPS) of the likelihood ratio distri-
bution function.3 He shows that for moral hazard situations with a risk-neutral
principal the MPS criterion is less restrictive than the two aforementioned criteria
and that it applies to a broader set of comparisons.
Based on Kims work, we dene the notion of mechanism su¢ ciency and dis-
tinguish it from the well known concept of statistical su¢ ciency. Heuristically
a signal is said to be statistically su¢ cient for an other random variable if none
2See also Gjesdal [1982] and Grossman and Hart [1983].
3This criterion is related to the Fisher measure of the quantity of information found in the
statistical literature.
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of the informational content is lost. However, in an agency problem the princi-
pal may not care about losing some statistically relevant information if it is not
useful to correctly align the agents incentive. As a result, we dene a signal to
be mechanism su¢ cient to an other random variable if none of the information
relevant to the principal is lost. The main purpose of this paper is to examplify in
a simple environment with risk neutral participants the distinction between these
two concepts. Though the risk neutrality assumption is strong, it is justied be-
cause it ensures that the di¤erence between both notions of su¢ ciency is, in fact,
maximal.4
From a more applied point of view, our results provide a strong theoretical
justication for the widespread use of dichotomic monitoring schemes (of the fail
or passtype) in the agency literature where the principals monitoring e¤ort is
endogenized. Rather than assuming as a simplication that the signals observed
by the principal are binary and that they satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
condition, we show that the e¢ cient aggregation of information leads to a statistic
with these kind of characteristics.5 Our result is a generalization of Park [1995],
where it is shown in a similar model that if the rst-best outcome can be attained
4It is maximal in the sense that the informational content of any system can be contained in
a binary statistic.
5For example Baron and Besanko [1984], Laffont and Tirole [1993] and Mirrlees
[1974].
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the optimal contract is a bonus contract. One interpretation of our result is that
bonus contract remain optimal even when rst-best is not attainable.
The basic framework is described in section 2. In section 3 we introduce
the notion of mechanism su¢ ciency. In section 4 our main result are derived
under somewhat restrictive su¢ cient conditions. In section 5 we show that the
same results can be obtained under much weaker conditions, without imposing
any prior ordering requirements on signals. The implications for the ordering of
information systems are drawn in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
The agents action space is a real interval A = [a; a]. The action or e¤ort level
is observed by the agent only, but the principal obtains imperfect ex post infor-
mation. The information system consists of a nite set S of possible observations
with a family fp(s; a); s 2 Sga2A of probability distributions. The signals s 2 S
may be multidimensional, with quantitative and (or) qualitative information. The
characteristics of the information system are common knowledge. We assume the
following:
Assumption (A1): p(s; a) > 0 for every s 2 S and every a 2 A.
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Assumption (A2): For every s 2 S, p(s; a) is twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable with respect to a.
Assumption (A3): For every a 2 A, pa(s; a) 6= 0 for some s 2 S.
(A1) eliminates information systems with moving supports, which lead to trivial
solutions. (A2) is a regularity condition. Finally (A3) essentially states that
signals are informative with respect to any action that may be required from the
agent.
The agent is risk-neutral with utility t C(a), where t is the transfer from the
principal to the agent and C(a) is the agents cost of e¤ort function, with C 0(a) > 0
and C 00(a)  0. The transfer to the agent is constrained by the limited liability
condition t   L, where the liability limit L  0 represents the maximum penalty
than can be imposed on the agent. The agents reservation utility is normalized
to zero.
The ex post signal generated by the information system is observable by both
parties. A contract or mechanism is a schedule t(s) specifying the transfer from
the principal to the agent for each possible signal. The mechanism t(s) implements
the action ba if
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ba 2 argmax
a
X
s2S
p(s; a)t(s)  C(a); (2.1)
X
s2S
p(s;ba)t(s)  C(ba)  0; (2.2)
t(s)   L, for every s 2 S. (2.3)
That is, the mechanism provides the correct incentives for the action considered
by the principal and it satises the agents participation and limited liability
constraints. For a required action ba, the principals problem is to design the
implementing mechanism so as to minimize the expected transfer
X
s2S
p(s;ba)t(s): (2.4)
3. Mechanism Su¢ cient Statistics
The signals generated by the information system can be aggregated. A real-valued
statistic Y is a mapping from the set of signals S to the set of real numbers and
may be interpreted as an aggregator of information. We write Y (S) for the image
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of Y and y 2 Y (S) for a possible realization of the variable. In what follows,
di¤erent properties are dened with the qualication for a 2 B, where B is
a subinterval of the action space A. When the qualication is omitted, this is
understood to mean that the property holds with respect to the whole action
space. A basic distinction is that between statistical su¢ ciency and mechanism
su¢ ciency.
Definition (Statistical Su¢ ciency): The statistic Y is su¢ cient for a 2 B if
the conditional distribution of s 2 S given Y is constant with respect to a 2 B.
This denition di¤ers slightly from the one usually found in the agency lit-
erature. Its main advantage is that it does not rely on the agents action being
interpreted as a random variable (see, for example, Holmström [1979]), which
would not be appropriate in the present context.6 Let (s; y; a) denote the con-
ditional probability of s given a realization y of some statistic Y . Then
(s; y; a) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if Y (s) 6= y;
p(s;a)P
s:Y (s)=y
p(s;a)
if Y (s) = y:
(3.1)
6On the equivalence between this denition (due to Neyman) and the Bayesian denition,
see for instance Gourieroux and Montfort [1995]. Note that assumption (A3) ensures that
a su¢ cient statistics cannot be a degenerate random variable.
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The statistic is su¢ cient for a 2 B if the expression for the conditional prob-
ability, when Y (s) = y, is constant on B. This leads directly to the following
characterization:
Statistical Sufficiency Criteria: Let Y be a statistic with probability
distribution g(y; a) Ps:Y (s)=y p(s; a). The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The statistic Y is su¢ cient for a 2 B.
(ii) If Y (s) = Y (s0), p(s
0;a)
p(s;a)
is constant on B.
(iii) For every a 2 B, pa(s;a)
p(s;a)
= ga(y;a)
g(y;a)
if Y (s) = y.
It is a well known result that a su¢ cient statistic includes all the relevant
information for the principals problem:
Proposition 1 (Holmström [1979])7: Let t(s) be a mechanism imple-
menting ba. If Y is a su¢ cient statistic, there exists another mechanism (s)
that implements ba at the same expected cost for the principal and that satises
(s) = '(Y (s)).
In section 4 we derive the optimal mechanism implementing some required
action. Considered as a statistic, a mechanism t(s) aggregates information. If a
7The above denition of statistical su¢ ciency allows for a more general and simpler proof
than in Holmströms [1979] article. In particular, the demonstration does not need to rely on
the validity of the rst-order approach.
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mechanism were optimal only if it is a su¢ cient statistic, one would conclude that
the principal must use all the statistically relevant information provided by the
information system. By contrast, if the best mechanism is not a su¢ cient statistic,
some of the statistically relevant information is redundant from a mechanism-
design point of view. This observation suggests the following distinction:
Definition (Mechanism Su¢ ciency): A statistic X is mechanism su¢ cient
for a 2 B if the cost-minimizing mechanism implementing any a 2 B can be
written as t(s) = '(X(s)).
Though Kim [1995] did not explicitly formulate the terminology of a mech-
anism su¢ cient statistic, the concept follows easily from his work. The current
formulation claries the distinction between the statistical denition of su¢ ciency
and the mechanism design concept. The di¤erence can arise because, from the
principals perspective, loosing statistically relevant information does not matter
if it is not useful to align the agents incentive.
4. E¢ cient Aggregation of Information
The derivation of the optimal mechanism rests on the validity of the rst-order
approach; by this is meant the possibility of replacing the incentive compatibility
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constraint with the rst-order condition of the agents optimization problem. It
is well known that MLRC and CDFC are su¢ cient for the rst-order approach
to be valid.8 We rst impose these conditions and then show that similar results
can be obtained under less restrictive conditions. For completeness, we recall
some standard denitions where Y denotes a statistic with probability distribution
g(y; a) Ps:Y (s)=y p(s; a):
Definition (MLRC): The statistic Y is said to satisfy strict MLRC for a 2 B
if ga(y;a)
g(y;a)
is non-decreasing for all a 2 B and strictly increasing for some a 2 B:
Definition (CDFC): The statistic Y satises CDFC if its cumulative prob-
ability distribution
P
yy0 g(y; a) is convex in a for every y
0 2 Y (S).
The next proposition describes the least-cost mechanism for implementing an
action a > a.9
Proposition 2: Assume there exists a su¢ cient statistic Y satisfying the
8See Rogerson [1985].
9To implement a there is no need to provide incentives to the agent and t(s) = C(a) for every
s 2 S is optimal.
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strict MLRC and CDFC. Let yM = maxf y j y 2 Y (S)g. Then
X(s) =
8>><>>:
1 if Y (s) = yM
0 if Y (s) 6= yM
(4.1)
is a mechanism su¢ cient statistic for a 2 A. Letting h(a) Ps:X(s)=1 p(s; a), the
optimal mechanism implementing the action a 2 (a; a] has the form
t(s) =
8>><>>:
T + C 0(a)=h0(a) if X(s) = 1
T if X(s) = 0
(4.2)
where
T = max

 L;C(a)  C
0(a)
h0(a)=h(a)

; (4.3)
and the expected cost to the principal is
CP (a) = max

C(a);
C 0(a)
h0(a)=h(a)
  L

: (4.4)
Proof: See the appendix.
The optimal mechanism is dichotomic. As in Park (1995), it is a bonus
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contract of the pass or fail type. It can be described by a non-contingent
transfer T and a bonus equal to C 0(a)=h0(a), paid to the agent only if X = 1 or
equivalently Y = yM is observed.10 The value of the non-contingent transfer T
depends on whether it is the limited liability or the participation constraint that
is binding. If the limited liability constraint is binding, then T =  L and the cost
to the principal is CP (a) > C(a), which means that the agent earns a rent. If it
is not binding, T is set so as to satisfy the participation constraint.
Due to MLRC, the partition of the set of signals on which transfers are con-
ditioned does not depend on the action that is to be implemented (nor does it
depend on the agents liability limit or on his cost of e¤ort function). Most of the
information provided by the information system is irrelevant from the principals
point of view, in the sense that the least cost mechanism would be feasible even
if the principal were only able to observe the binary variable X. Due to the risk-
neutrality assumption the result is extreme, but it demonstrates the importance
to distinguish between statistical and mechanism su¢ ciency. In the remaining of
the paper, we generalize the result and examine some of its implication for the
ranking of information systems.
10Obviously, the optimal scheme could also have been described by a non-contingent transfer
and a penalty if X = 0 is observed.
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A straightforward generalization consists in showing that MLRC is not needed.
In the following result, we show that the essence of a pass or failmechanism
is that the agent is penalized (at least in the sense of not getting the bonus)
whenever a more favorable signal could have been observed11.
Proposition 3: Let Y be a su¢ cient statistic and assume there exists a
realization yM that is more favorable than any y 6= yM . Dene the statistic
X(s) =
8>><>>:
1 if Y (s) = yM
0 if Y (s) 6= yM
(4.5)
If X satises CDFC, it is mechanism-su¢ cient for a 2 A and the optimal mech-
anism is as in proposition 2.
Proof:The result follows directly from the proof of proposition 2 by using the
denition of a more favorable signal and equation (7.14).
MLRC and CDFC with respect to a su¢ cient statistic, as in proposition 2,
imply the conditions in proposition 3. That is, they imply the existence of a
realization that is more favorable than any other and they also imply that the
11Following Milgrom [1981], we say y is more favorable than y0 for a 2 B if ga(y;a)g(y;a)  ga(y
0;a)
g(y0;a) ,
for all a 2 B with a strict inequality for some a 2 B:
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binary statistic dened in (4.5) satises CDFC. The conditions of proposition 3
are of course much weaker, as an example at the end of the section will show. In
either case the mechanism-su¢ cient statistic satises MLRC. Observe also that
under the conditions of proposition 3 any a 2 A can be implemented.
In the next section, we show that similar results can be obtained under even
weaker conditions, but with di¤erent mechanism-su¢ cient statistics depending on
the action to be implemented.
An Example
Consider a situation where a signal s 2 S corresponds to the realization of
n independently distributed Bernoulli variables. That is, s = (s1; : : : ; sn) where
si 2 f0; 1g with probability Pr[si = 1 ja] = qi(a). Letting q0i(a) > 0 and q00i (a) < 0,
the event si = 1 can be interpreted as passwith respect to the i-th check in a
test involving n checks, the event si = 0 as failwith respect to the i-th check.
Case 1
Suppose that the sis are identically distributed so that qi(a) = q(a) for i =
1; : : : ; n. Dene the statistic Y (s1; : : : ; sn) =
Pn
i=1 si. Such a statistic counts
the total number of passmarks and its possible realizations are f0; 1; : : : ; ng,
as compared to the 2n possible signals in S. Y has the binomial distribution
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B(n; q(a)) and is well known to be a su¢ cient statistic for the probability q(a).
Because the latter is monotonic in a, Y is also su¢ cient for a. It is easily veried
that Y satises the strict MLRC; if there is enough concavity in the function q(a),
it will also satisfy CDFC. Proposition 2 will then hold and the statistic
X(s) =
8>><>>:
1 if s = (1; : : : ; 1)
0 if s 6= (1; : : : ; 1)
(4.6)
will be mechanism-su¢ cient for a 2 A. Equivalently, the mechanism-su¢ cient
statistic could have been dened by X = 1 if Y = n and X = 0 if Y < n.
Case 2
Suppose now that the sis are not identically distributed, so that qi(a) and
qj(a) are di¤erent functions for i 6= j. This implies that in general the image of
a su¢ cient statistic will usually have the same cardinality as S. Furthermore,
the information system does not satisfy MLRC in that two arbitrary signals in
S are not necessarily comparable. However, there is a partial ranking between
signals in the sense that s0 is more favorable than s if s0  s, s0 6= s. In particular,
s = (1; : : : ; 1) is more favorable than any other signal. If there is enough concavity
in the functions qi(a), the conditions for proposition 3 will therefore hold and the
statistic X, as dened in (4.6), will be mechanism-su¢ cient for a 2 A.
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In both cases the agent is penalized (or does not get his bonus) if he fails in
at least one of the n checks and the sanction is the same irrespective of the number
of fails. In other words, the benchmark for pass in the optimal dichotomic
scheme is passwith respect to all of the n checks. This should not be interpreted
as implying that the agent is punished more often than he is rewarded: if the qis
are close to one, the probability of not receiving the bonus may be small. The
point is not to penalize often but to penalize whenever a more favorable signal
could have been observed, as emphasized in the previous section; in the example,
this occurs whenever the agent gets a failmark in any of the n checks.
5. A Generalization
So far the information system has been assumed to exhibit a most favorable
signal (possibly aggregated) that serves as the passbenchmark in the optimal
dichotomic mechanism, irrespective of the action to be implemented. We now
relax the condition that there exists such a signal.
Let Y be a minimal su¢ cient statistic with probability distribution g(y; a),
where a statistic is said to be minimal su¢ cient if its image has the smallest
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cardinality among all su¢ cient statistics. Dene12
Y M(S) =

y 2 Y (S) j for every y0 6= y, ga(y; a)
g(y; a)
>
ga(y
0; a)
g(y0; a)
for some a 2 A

(5.1)
In some sense, the set Y M(S) replaces the most favorable signal: it is formed
by taking the realizations of the statistic that may constitute a most favorable
signal at least locally, with respect to a subinterval of the action-space. The subset
of elementary signals that generate such realizations is
SM =

s 2 S j Y (s) 2 Y M(S)	 (5.2)
Assumption (A3) ensures that Y M(S) and therefore SM are not empty. The
following convexity assumption is introduced:
Assumption (A4): For every s 2 SM and a 2 A, paa(s; a)  0 if pa(s; a) > 0.
We will use (A4) in lieu of MLRC and CDFC. In the standard model MLRC
generates an exogenous ordering and CDFC imposes a convexity structure on this
ordering. By contrast, we do not impose any ordering. In fact, it is the purpose
12We restrict our attention to minimal su¢ cient statistics to ensure that YM (S) 6= ;. This
observation follows immediately from the denition since, in the case of a minimal su¢ cient
statistic for any y1; y2 2 Y (S); ga(y1;a)g(y1;a) 6=
ga(y2;a)
g(y2;a)
for some a 2 A:
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of this section to show that signals are endogenously ordered according to their
usefulness to the principal. In particular, the ordering might depend on the action
to be implemented. As a result, we have to rely on a local convexity hypothesis..
The requirement in (A4) can be interpreted as a decreasing return hypothesis for
favorable information.
To further motivate this assumption, we show that (A4) is implied by the
conditions for proposition 3. Recall that the latter proposition holds under both
an ordering and a convexity condition: for a su¢ cient statistic Y , it was assumed
that there existed a most favorable realization yM and that the probability
distribution of the statistic satised gaa(yM ; a)  0 for every a 2 A. Because
yM is a globally most favorable signal, it is clear that s 2 SM if and only if13
Y (s) = yM . Also, because Y is a su¢ cient statistic, it is easily veried that
gaa(y
M ; a)  0 implies paa(s; a)  0 for s 2 SM . Thus, the convexity condition
of proposition 3 (as well as the more restrictive MLRC and CDFC conditions of
proposition 2) imply the statement in the assumption.
We now show that assumptions (A1) to (A4) are su¢ cient for any action to
be implementable and for the least-cost mechanism to be dichotomic, as in the
13By restricting the requirement in (A4) to the set SM , we keep the hypothesis to the smallest
essential set. We also note that otherwise this equivalence would not hold and as a result MLRC
and CDFC would not imply (A4).
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previous sections:
Proposition 4: The statistic
Za(s) =
8>><>>:
1 if s 2 arg max
s2SM
pa(s;a)
p(s;a)
;
0 otherwise.
(5.3)
is mechanism su¢ cient for action a 2 A.
Proof: See the appendix.
The di¤erence with respect to the previous results is that the ordering of
signals for the purpose of determining the passand fail events now derives
endogenously from the cost-minimizing process and will in general depend on the
action required from the agent. An interesting question concerns the relationship
between the orderinginduced by the mechanism su¢ cient statistic Za and the
ordering usually dened on the set of signals by the more favorable thanrelation
(or equivalently by MLRC). We have:
Proposition 5: For every a 2 A, the statistic Za dened in (5.3) satises
the strict MLRC and CDFC in some neighborhood of action a.
Proof: See the appendix.
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In other words, the mechanism-su¢ cient statistic satises at least a local
MLRC, in the sense that Za = 1 represents a most favorable signal at least with
respect to actions in some neighborhood containing the action to be implemented.
To conclude the section, we provide an example where there is a switching of the
most favorable signal depending on the action to be implemented.
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An Example
Let A = [0; 1] and S = fs1; s2; s3g, with p(si; a) = i exp[ia   12ia2] for
i = 1; 2 and p(s3; a) = 1   p(s1; a)   p(s2; a). Let i > 0 and 2i < i < i < 1
so that pa(si; a) > 0 and paa(si; a) < 0 for i = 1; 2; p(s; a) > 0 for every s 2 S is
ensured by choosing the is small enough. For i = 1; 2
pa(si; a)
p(si; a)
= i   ia > 0 for all a 2 [0; 1]: (5.4)
Assume that 1 > 2 and 1   1 < 2   2 and let ba solve
1   1a = 2   2a: (5.5)
Then the statistic
X0(s) =
8>><>>:
1 if s = s1
0 if s 2 fs2; s3g
(5.6)
is mechanism-su¢ cient for a 2 [0;ba], while the statistic
X1(s) =
8>><>>:
1 if s = s2
0 if s 2 fs1; s3g
(5.7)
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is mechanism-su¢ cient for a 2 [ba; 1].
The intuition is that the probability of observing X0 = 1 rather than X0 = 0 is
more sensitive to changes in a for a < ba than the probability of observing X1 = 1
rather than X1 = 0. Therefore, X0 corresponds to a more e¢ cient partition of
the set of signals when the action to be implemented is less than ba. The converse
is true for actions greater than ba. The principal is indi¤erent between X0 and X1
if she wants to implement a = ba. Consider now the statistic14
Za(s) =
8>><>>:
1 if s 2 argmax
s2S
pa(s; a)=p(s; a);
0 otherwise.
(5.8)
It should be obvious that Za = X0 if a < ba while Za = X1 if a > ba. For a = ba, we
have Zba = 1 if s 2 fs1; s2g and Zba is mechanism-su¢ cient only at ba. To implement
ba, the principal is therefore indi¤erent between X0, X1 and Zba.
Given these results, it is now feasible to obtain the principals cost function of
14Notice that SM = fs1; s2g: However if we assumed 1   1 = 2   2 so that the two lines
in the gure intersect at the point a = 1, then SM = fs1g: We see in that case why it would
not be important to impose restrictions on s2 since X0 is mechanism su¢ cient over the entire
range.
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implementing an action:
CP (a) = max

C(a);
C 0(a)
max f1   1a; 2   2ag
  L

: (5.9)
If C(0) = 0 and C 0(0) > 0, this function is discontinuous at a = 0 if L < C 0(0)=1.
We note that for a su¢ ciently large liability limit, L  C 0(1)=(2   2)   C(1),
the principals cost is the same as under full information for every a 2 [0; 1].
6. Comparison of Information Systems
Let (S1; p1) and (S2; p2) be two information systems (S refers to the signal set and
p to the family of distribution functions). Proposition 4 leads directly to a simple
criterion for comparing information systems.
Definition: Information system (S2; p2) is more e¢ cient than (S1; p1) at a
if, for every liability limit L and cost of e¤ort function C, the cost to the principal
for implementing a is not greater with (S2; p2) than with (S1; p1), and is strictly
less for some L and C.
From the proof of proposition 4, we easily obtain the following result:
Corollary 1: Let Zia 2 f0; 1g with probability distribution hi(a) be the
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mechanism-su¢ cient statistic for implementing action a 2 A using the information
system (Si; pi). Then information system (S2; p2) is more e¢ cient than (S1; p1) at
a 6= a if and only if
h02(a)
h2(a)
>
h01(a)
h1(a)
: (6.1)
In a context were the agent is risk averse, Kim [1995] introduced a su¢ cient
condition for the (partial) ordering of information systems and showed that his
criterion was implied by Blackwells e¢ ciency condition and that it nested Holm-
ströms concept of informativeness. In contrast to Kim, and because the agent
is assumed here to be risk-neutral, our condition is necessary and su¢ cient for
an information system to be more e¢ cient than another; it therefore provides a
complete ordering of information systems (though the ordering is only valid for
implementing action a 2 A).
The relationship between condition (6.1) and Kims criterion is as follows. For
i = 1; 2, dene the statistics Zia(s) = p
i
a(s; a)=p
i(s; a) and denote their distribution
functions by F ia. According to Kims criterion, information system 2 is more
e¢ cient for action a than information system 1 if F 2a is a mean-preserving spread
24
of F 1a . Now, it is easily veried that this condition implies
h02(a)
h2(a)
 h
0
1(a)
h1(a)
: (6.2)
Thus, in a risk-neutral environment, Kims criterion is su¢ cient for system 2 to
be at least as e¢ cient as system 1 (in the weak sense), but it is neither necessary
nor in fact su¢ cient for system 2 to be (strictly) more e¢ cient than system 1.
Obviously, if information systems are to be compared on the basis of the cost
of implementing any a 2 (a; a], the ordering induced by condition (6.1) can only
be a partial one. On this basis, (S2; p2) will be more e¢ cient than (S1; p1) if and
only if h02(a)=h2(a)  h01(a)=h1(a) for every a, with strict inequality for some a.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has introduced the notion of a mechanism su¢ cient statistic and shown
that it must be distinguished from the standard concept of a su¢ cient statistic.
To substantiate the di¤erence, we have analyzed the e¢ cient use of information in
simple agency relationship with risk-neutral parties, under a fairly general charac-
terization of the information system available to the principal. With risk-neutral
parties the di¤erence between both concepts of su¢ ciency is shown to be maximal:
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the optimal incentive scheme is dichotomic and therefore a binary statistic is all
that is needed to summarize the signals generated by the information system.
It follows that, to compare di¤erent information systems, it is su¢ cient to
examine the binary mechanism-su¢ cient statistics from the di¤erent systems with
respect to the action that is to be implemented. This, we show, generates an
endogenous ordering of signals according to their usefulness to the principal. It
is important to note that we did not impose the standard requirements of MLRC
and CDFC. Instead, we introduced a weaker requirement that can be interpreted
as a hypothesis of decreasing return for favourble information.15 Specically we
showed that our hypothesis is implied by MLRC and CDFC, but that the reverse
is not true. Owing to the risk-neutrality hypothesis, our criterion for comparing
information systems was shown to be less demanding than Kims MPS criterion.
Like the MPS criterion, we used the likelihood ratio distribution function to dene
the ranking. However, because of the risk neutrality, only one point on that
distribution function matters. As a result, from the principals perspective each
distribution function can be characterized by a scalar and the resulting ordering
of information structures is complete. With respect to this ordering, we proved
15In this respect, albeit in a simpler framework because of the risk-neutrality assumption,
our paper is related to a recent article by Sinclair-Desgagné [1994] on the validity of the
rst-order approach in multi-signal agency problems.
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the interesting corollary that the mechanism su¢ cient statistic satises a local
version of the standard MLRC ordering.
There are numerous interesting extensions of the present paper. One possi-
bility would be to make use of the simplicity of these results to derive a general
characterization of the principals decision problem in choosing between di¤erent
information systems, i.e., in trading-o¤ the cost and e¢ ciency of di¤erent sys-
tems. A second possibility would be to go back to the standard model with risk
averse participants and attempt to reexamine the di¤erence between statistical
and mechanism su¢ ciency.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2:Using the result from proposition 1, we can rewrite
the principals problem of implementing action a 2 A at minimal cost as:
min
fw(y)jy2Y g
X
y2Y
g(y; a)w(y) (7.1)
a 2 argmaxea
X
y2Y
g(y;ea)w(y)  C(ea); (7.2)
X
y2Y
g(y; a)w(y)  C(a)  0; (7.3)
w(y)   L; 8 y 2 Y . (7.4)
27
By assumption, because of MLRC and CDFC the rst order approach is valid.
We resolve the optimization problem (7.1) by substituting for (7.2) its rst-order
condition. We dene the Lagrangian:
L(L; a;; ; w(y); (y)y2Y ) =
X
y2Y
g(y; a)w(y) (7.5)
 (
X
y2Y
ga(y; a)w(y)  C 0(a))
+(
X
y2Y
g(y; a)w(y)  C(a)) +
X
y2Y
(y)(w(y) + L)
where  is the multiplier of the agents rst-order condition of the incentive com-
patibility constraint,  the multiplier of the participation constraint and the (y)s
are the multipliers of the limited liability constraints. We consider two situations.
1.  > 0: In this case by complementary slackness, we know that the partici-
pation constraint is binding. Thus:
L(L; a;; ; w(y); (y)y2Y ) = C(a): (7.6)
2.  = 0: We partition the sample space Y . We dene Y 0 to be the set of ys
where the constraints w(y)+L are not binding, i.e. Y 0 = fy 2 Y j(y) = 0g.
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The partition implies:
8y 2 Y 0; g(y; a)
ga(y; a)
=  (7.7)
8y =2 Y 0; w(y) =  L (7.8)
(7.7) results from the rst-order condition of the Lagrangian by setting  = 0
and (y) = 0: Dene (y) = w(y)+L:We note that 8y =2 Y 0; (y) = 0, thus
from the rst-order condition of the agents problem:
X
y2Y
ga(y; a)w(y) =
X
y2Y 0
ga(y; a)(y) (7.9)
= C 0(a) (7.10)
Using this equality and complementary slackness, we can solve for the La-
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grangian:
L(L; a;; ; s(y); (y)y2Y ) =
X
y2Y
g(y; a)w(y) (7.11)
=
X
y2Y 0
g(y; a)(y)  L (7.12)
= 
X
y2Y 0
ga(y; a)(y)  L (7.13)
=
g(y0; a)
ga(y0; a)
C 0(a)  L (7.14)
where y0 is an element of Y 0. Given the resulting expected cost and the strict
MLRC hypothesis, we conclude immediately y0 = yM i.e. Y 0 = max fyjy 2
Y (S)g:
Wether  > 0 or  = 0 depends on wether there is enough information content
in the outcome of the random experiment to extract the entire rent. When  = 0;
then T =  L and when  > 0; then T =   g(yM ;a)
ga(yM ;a)
C 0(a) +C(a): The result of the
proposition follows immediately by change of notation.
Proof of proposition 4: We rewrite the principals problem:
min
ft(s)js2Sg
X
s2S
p(s; a)t(s) (7.15)
a 2 argmaxea
X
s2S
p(s;ea)t(s)  C(ea) (7.16)
30
X
s2S
p(s; a)t(s)  C(a)  0 (7.17)
t(s)   L; 8 s 2 S. (7.18)
We follow standard practice. We assume that the rst-order approach is valid,
solve for the optimal solution under this hypothesis and conclude by showing that
(A4) guarantees that the resulting mechanism is globally incentive compatible. If
we follow the same steps as in the proof of proposition 2, adjusting for the change
in notation, we obtain:
L(L; a;; ; t(s); (s)s2S) = p(s
0; a)
pa(s0; a)
C 0(a)  L (7.19)
with s0 2 S 0: Given the expected cost structure, we have S 0 3 arg max
s2SM
pa(s;a)
p(s;a)
. To
conclude, we show that (A4) guarantees that the second order condition of the
agents problem is satised. We proceed by contradiction.
1. We note that if the rst-order condition is at a point a 2 A the it is a local
maximum. Indeed, for the rst order condition to be satised,we must have
pa(a; s) > 0 which implies paa(a; s)  0:
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2. Suppose a 2 A is not the global maximum. Then there exists ba which
yields a higher prot. This in turns implies there exists a local minimum ea
between those two points. For a local minimum, we must have pa(s; a) > 0
and paa(s; a) > 0 which by (A4) yields a contradiction.
Proof of proposition 5 : Let h0(a) > 0 for some a 2 A; then h0(a) > 0 for
some neighbourhood and by (A4) h00(a)  0 in that same neighborhood.
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